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WHY SPACETIME IS NOT A HIDDEN CAUSE: A REALIST STORY 
 
GRAHAM NERLICH1 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
“Spacetime acts on matter, telling it how to move” (Misner et al. 1970 p. 5; Taylor 
et al. 1991 p 275). 
Abstract: Spacetime realism requires that it is not hidden and not a cause. Its style of 
explanation is geometrical. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
How does – how could - spacetime act on matter or tell it how to move? 
The best short argument against realism runs like this: if spacetime is a real entity for 
General Relativity (GR) then surely the acting and the telling must be a causing - a hidden 
causing. But, equally surely, spacetime is the wrong kind of thing to make matter move. That’s 
bad physics and bad metaphysics. But if spacetime causes nothing, it explains nothing either. 
So weed it out of the ontology of GR and settle for a codification – whatever that is.2 [DiSalle 
1994, 321-8 1995, 275-7. Brown 2005, pp. 24-5, Brown and Pooley 2004, Torretti 2006 p. 
3n. For doubts about codification (in another context) see Nerlich 2005 §2.1, 3.1] 
The argument goes astray from the start. Realism doesn’t need and can’t admit 
spacetime as causing matter to move. Spacetime is not a hidden cause because not a cause.3 
Yet spacetime explains what matter does under pure gravitation. It does so rather 
straightforwardly. It exploits various direct identities. That is misunderstood, widely I think, 
perhaps because the search for causes clouds the issue.  
Familiar thoughts motivate this paper. Gravity makes no sense as action across a 
distance by some massive things on others. It is not a force, not a cause. GR makes sense only 
as a local theory: it demands proximal explanation. In lots of pure gravitation situations, the 
only proximal feature available to explain anything is local spacetime structure. But surely it 
can’t explain matter’s motion by causing it.  So a style of geometrical explanation both local and 
acausal surely looks at least worth consideration. Of course the idea is frightening. Ontologists 
abhor spacetime just as nature, it was once supposed, abhors a vacuum.  
Apart from its last step, the premises of this paper’s argument rest on common 
ground; indeed, they make up the simplest, basic ideas of GR. The step to the conclusion is 
no less simple and direct. Further, there are simple examples already to hand of non-causal 
geometrical explanation. The handedness of hands depends on whether their containing 
space is orientable or not. Roughly, they are handed if there exist no paths in the space that will 
smoothly map an asymmetrical object onto its mirror image, and not handed if such paths exist. 
This isn’t causal explanation – space does nothing to hands. That is some sort of existential 
explanation. The shape of spherical space explains why there are no similar shapes of 
                                                
1 This paper was delivered at the Ontology of Spacetime Conference, Montreal, 2008. Forthcoming in Petkov, 
V (2010) 
2 For doubts see Nerlich 2005 § 2.1, 3.1. 
3 And not hidden either; see Nerlich 1994, 38-43. 
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different sizes in that space - why it has no similarity geometry. For triangles with greater 
perimeters there is more space, more area, that they must contain That, too, is somehow 
existential. It’s about how much space there is.  
What follows in this paper is familiar and obvious too. So much so, that it continues to 
puzzle me why it needs to be said. But that is a dangerous state of mind in which to approach 
the problem. I suspect that the main difficulty lies in the horror of spacetime realism. 
Dispelling the horror is the hard part of this work, but it is not closely examined here. 
I start with some prehistory of inertial motion. 
 
2 Cause and classical inertial motion 
 
Confusion once reigned as to what keeps an arrow flying. Galileo’s giant stride towards clarity 
turned on the relativity of motion and the composition of velocities. He saw that “What keeps 
the arrow flying?” is the wrong question. Instead, ask what causes it ever to stop. Then there 
are genuine causal answers: e.g. gravity pulls it down to earth, or it hits something. A more 
precise message was fogged by the great Italian’s preoccupation with circular (including 
horizontal) motion. This obscured the role of linearity in free motion. (Chalmers 1993). 
Newton’s first law of motion is clear on linearity: 
 
Every body persists in its state of rest or of moving uniformly straight ahead, except 
insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.  (Newton 1999, 
416) 
 
Thus Newton straightened out Galileo’s story, but only to the extent of Corollary V 
 
When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another 
are the same whether the space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight 
forward without circular motion.  (Newton 1999, 423)  
 
Notoriously, the rest or motion of the ‘given space’ is absolute. Perhaps this is why Newton 
hinted at the older thought4 that a “force of inertia” (“vis insita” or “vis inertiae”) causes the 
arrow’s flying on. 5 This still leaves something to be desired but it is not the thought that space 
could cause anything.  
The released bowstring pushes the arrow and causes it to fly. There, cause is force. If 
we look for a cause why the arrow keeps on flying, we look for a cause of inertial, free-fall 
motion: we look not for an initiating cause but for a proximal one. That a thing is moving 
inertially at some velocity now might be because it was just moving at that velocity. However, 
the earlier state doesn’t force the later one, despite being a distinct, preceding state. A force is 
needed to change it. The structure of space is plainly no such cause even though its straights 
are the privileged paths.  
But doesn’t the preceding inertial motion, the conserved momentum, cause the present 
inertial motion? Not if we accept both the first law and the relativity of inertial motion. An 
adroit frame-swap can transform any state of free motion to a state of rest. The effect vanishes 
and the cause with it. That is because the 4-acceleration vector is 0 so no force recognised in 
GR can be at work. Any further search for a cause of inertial states must look for an account 
                                                
4 Compare Buridan and Benedetti. See Wikipedia: the free encyclopedia article ‘The Principle of Inertia 2.1.1. 
5 See ‘A Guide to Newton’s Prtincipia’ by Bernard Cohen, Chapter 4, 4.7 esp. p. 98 in Newton 1999). 
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of why things endure. I grant, more for the sake of getting along than from conviction, that it 
will be a causal story (e.g. Tooley 2001, 398). Even if there is one, space (spacetime) has no 
part in it. There is no need to ask why an object at rest in an inertial frame stays put; for any 
object in uniform motion there is a frame in which it is at rest. The thing merely endures. 
This is satisfactory: questions can rest at this point.6   
 It’s remarkable that the first law says nothing at all about the causal powers of any 
body to which it applies. It says nothing about what causes anything to endure. The second 
law requires that all bodies have mass; the first mentions no property whatever. Remarkably, 
too, we have good classical reason to think that no body ever actually does escape the 
(gravitational) causal net or persists in its state of rest or uniform motion (although there 
might be some bodies on which the resultant of forces is zero, briefly or not). This suggests 
that the law is about trajectories, spatio-temporal entities, not about what might occupy them. It 
tells us nothing of how any such trajectory ever comes to be occupied. It need say nothing 
about why an occupant remains on the trajectory, but it does explain why causes are needed 
to drive it off. It is about the importance for dynamics of the default case: the non-causal 
trajectory in which there is zero acceleration. The default, in pre-spacetime talk, is rest-or-
uniform-motion. I will call these Galileo trajectories. Their importance emerges in the relativity 
of motion and the composition of velocities, which, in turn, depend on the spatial and 
temporal symmetries of classical mechanics. 
 The first law really is first. It is conceptually simpler and theoretically deeper than the 
2nd. Once we can decide simply when forces are on or off, we can identify the required frames 
of reference (candidate rest states). Inertial motion is not defined by laws of motion: rather it is 
a rather direct observational truth as to what trajectory is found as forces approach zero. To a 
large extent, Newton decided this by seeing free motion as free from impressed forces (impacts, 
pushes and pulls) and gravity. This laid a groundwork: candidate forces should have (i) 
observable sources, and (ii) regularities governing (a) when and (b) how they are at work. This 
rules out arbitrary, conventional postulations of force. Only when we have the right frames of 
reference and, by implication, the right transformation group, may we explore accelerations 
relative to them in a comprehensive way; only then can forces be quantified and oriented. 
Then you can formulate the 2nd law and verify that 2nd derivatives are at the core of 
dynamics. That the 2nd law entails the first does not rob the first of first place. 
 
3 GR space, time and spacetime 
 
Here’s my strategy in a nutshell. In pure gravitation examples, GR explains what matter does 
by extending the idea of Galileo trajectories to 4-geodesics (straights7) in spacetime even 
though these often have no rest-or-uniform-motion image relative to frames of reference 
(space and time representations). Roughly, that a worldline is a Galileo 4-trajectory explains 
why its occupant is innocent of causal dependence, guidance etc. beyond its mere endurance 
(the mere extension of its worldline). It merely falls (floats) freely – free of causes and forces. 
                                                
6 If all that is sound, then there is a classical non-causal process, a changing of spatial distance between two 
suitably inertially moving things. The motion of neither is an effect, since it vanishes under frame swaps. The 
changing distance between them is a covariant quantity of the Galilean (Lorentz) group: it is a real change. The 
change is uncaused. If so, it is odd that this was never cited (at any rate it never caught on) as an obvious 
exception to the rule that all changes are caused. 
7 I write ‘straight’ where you might expect ‘geodesic’. Geodesics just are straights of whatever space they are in 
The shorter term reminds us of what matters about them for this paper. 
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Of course, the object has causal power to interact with other bodies and with force fields! 
However, the images of these Galileo 4-trajectories in space and time often do call up causal 
and dynamical stories about their occupants since, in that setting, they breach the first law. 
This is well illustrated by Einstein’s familiar example of a rotating disk in Minkowski 
spacetime. (Einstein 1920 Ch. XXIII, Einstein et al.1923; 115-7) Suppose an inertial frame F 
in which the disk’s centre is at rest. Relative to F, a particle in uniform motion crosses the 
centre of the disk. Its 4-trajectory is Galilean. Yet, relative to a frame co-moving with the disk, 
the particle follows an outward spiral at varying speed. It accelerates. The first law demands 
the postulation of a force field throughout the frame. It will vanish at the centre of the disk 
and vary as a function of its radius. Relative to that frame, the particle’s motion is said to be 
forced and caused. Plainly the path and speed of the particle are not uniform. Yet, in the 
spacetime representation, the 4-trajectory remains straight and Galilean. There is no force on 
the particle and no cause of its continuing motion-or-rest. The structure of spacetime explains 
how the trajectory is Galilean; it does not cause anything. 
 I place two conditions on cause: (i) if x causes y, then not (x = y); (ii) for mechanics, 
causes are forces. 
The explanatory role of spacetime in the behaviour of freely falling matter is twofold. 
It explains (as illustrated) how the apparent gravitational dynamics of free-fall particles in 
general frames of reference vanishes into the mere kinematics of geodesics in flat or curved 
spacetimes. It explains also by citing several identities. Suppose the trajectory of a cloud of test 
particles through flat spacetime projects it into a region of curved spacetime. There may be 
immanent causes for the persistence of the particles: they explain how the cloud gets into the 
curved region. Nothing in this implicates spacetime causally. The flatness of the region of 
spacetime does not cause the curvature of the neighbouring region that the cloud traverses. 
The change in shape of the cloud, the deviation of its point-parts, is the deviation of geodesic 
worldlines and not caused by it. 
 
(i) Free fall in a purely gravitational field 
 
I’ll enlarge that simple GR example in which the geometric structure of spacetime fully 
explains an observable behaviour of matter. Let’s begin with an idealised cloud of matter-
points (pressure free dust): it is spherical at t0, falling freely (“under gravity alone”) towards a 
massive object. To delete any influence from local matter, assume dust points with negligible 
mass, ignore gravitational forces between them, and assume there is no other interaction 
among the points. “Gravity” from the distant source is not erased; it is the curvature of 
spacetime. The cloud will change shape. 
The origin of a space-and-time frame of reference (not inertial) floats freely at the 
centre of the cloud. A point at rest there will remain at rest with zero gravitational force on it. 
The cloud changes shape round that central point which is at rest in the frame. In the 
direction of the distant source, the cloud gradually stretches out fore and aft, but it contracts 
across the orthogonal section – it gets longer and thinner. This closely approximates classical 
gravity, where it has a causal, dynamical explanation. Clearly, the non-central points move, 
indeed accelerate in the frame. The more distant points acquire larger 3-velocities in it: some 
move towards the centre, others away. What accelerates them is a force demanded by the 1st 
law, a tidal gravitational “force”. 
A similar tale may be told selecting any point in the cloud as at rest. 
That language, that array of theoretical concepts, is appropriate if we conceive of the 
frame (as we conceive of ourselves) as a spatial thing enduring in time. Spacetime is nowhere 
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in this image. ‘Spacetime’ is not among the concepts in which the space and time explanation 
may be requested or provided. 
Here the changing shape of the cloud needs an explanation. It’s explained by the 
curvature of the spacetime 4-region. The explaining facts must be distinct from what they 
explain if the explanation is causal. But they are the same facts. 
Each enduring point is an extended worldline. Spacetime doesn’t explain the 
particle’s extension along the straight nor what causes the straight to be occupied (and thus a 
worldline). Yet Galileo’s insight remains – don’t seek a cause for simplest dynamically-default 
states. That’s satisfactory because the straight has a zero acceleration vector at every point. 
That’s what a straight is. No acceleration, no force, no cause. That spacetime straights are the 
worldlines of simple endurance/extension is satisfactory for the same old reason – nothing to 
explain.8  Here’s where question and explanation may halt. 
What spacetime explains is why a 4-straight should be the dynamical default state. It 
can’t explain why anything is in that state. 
The identity of the state of affairs differently presented in these descriptions explains 
what happens to the cloud, so long as there is a cloud. It tells us why the trajectories of the 
points change the shape of the cloud: the worldlines of different points lie on different 
straights, and these straights deviate in curved spacetime. The deviating straights project 
down into accelerating space and time trajectories, among them those that happen to be 
trajectories of particles. The deviation doesn’t cause the acceleration. It’s what the 
acceleration is; it is the change in shape made up by the trajectories of the points. The 
identities forbid a causal tie. 
In turn, the deviation of the worldlines is not caused by the curvature of spacetime, 
since it is the curvature; curvature is the deviation of all geodesics. Flat spaces are those 
admitting parallels, so ‘curved space’ simply means ‘space in which straights deviate’.  
Spacetime doesn’t cause material worldlines to lie on straights. If you like, spacetime 
doesn’t fully explain all of this because it doesn’t explain the endurance of the test particles. 
But the endurance doesn’t cause the change in shape. Spacetime explains it through 
identities, not causes.  
In 1908 (Minkowski) and 1915 (Einstein) this style of explanation through various 
spacetime identities was without precedent and remains unique in science, both physically 
and metaphysically. Thus it shows the ontic type and role of spacetime as without parallel. 
That’s its metaphysical importance. 
Finally, to parody Quine - no identities without entities. Only a realist can tell this 
story. 
 
(ii)  Light bending 
 
Eddington confirmed the bending of light rays near the sun as predicted in GR. The 
immediate observation was of dots on (several) photographic plates of the sun at eclipse. The 
grouping of the dots was caused by a grouping of photons. Our question is about their 
separation and how spacetime structure explains it. 
                                                
8 It’s not so satisfactory that I assume that we will never find a deeper explanation for it or that the deeper 
explanation will be consistent with the one made out here. There is no explanation within General Relativity. 
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To say that light rays bend round the sun is to say that in the 3-space of some frame9, 
light rays do not move along straights of that 3-space. A tidal force, gravity, bends them, in this 
story.  
That’s causal. The story is a kind of fiction. 
Once more, spacetime is nowhere in this picture. ‘Spacetime’ is not among the 
concepts in which the space and time explanation may be requested or provided. 
In this case, too, the motion of photons translates up into lightlike straight worldlines. 
The mapping between space-and-time, and spacetime, representations is an identity. 
The structure of spacetime explains why the dots on the photographic plates are separated as 
they are. The explanatory structure is the curvature. Spacetime curvature consists in the 
deviation of its straights, including lightlike ones. That, in turn, explains the separation of dots 
on the plate. That’s how the photographic surface intersects the deviating luminal 4 straights, 
independently of whether the plate is there or not. Curvature does not cause the deviation 
because it is the deviation. The curvature tensor simply analyses and measures the deviation – an 
identity not a cause. 
Again, flat space is, unique in having parallels. The failure of parallels is the curvature: 
it is the deviation of straights.  
That completes the explanation. It is not causal; it is realistic – no identities without 
entities.  
 
4 About matter 
 
I’ve told my story with some idealised bit-players – test particles. My cloud of dust was 
misrepresented as made of massless particles each of which tracks a straight in a structure 
unaffected by these contents. But real dust is made of small but extended specks, not particles. 
Even specks have some mass that will constrain spacetime structure; clothed with specks, 
spacetime doesn’t have the same straights as it has naked. 
Any spacelike cross section of a speck will be intersected by more than one timelike 
straight. Since these deviate in curved spacetime, the causal story within any speck is not 
trivial. Elastic forces inside resist the deviation of the speck’s smaller parts: internal stresses, 
distortions, will arise in it. As elastic wholes, specks won’t lie on G-trajectories.  
 The causal story about specks is exhausted in the play of electromagnetic forces 
engaged in resisting the distortions and in any immanent causes of speck endurance. As 
before, spacetime explains the deviation of geodesics that change the electromagnetic forces, 
but it does not cause the forces. It continues to explain as before the causal-default part of the 
story - why this trajectory needs no cause for any geometrically simple extended thing to lie 
along it. At each point, its space-like acceleration vector is zero. The spacetime story is about 
the cause-free status of the trajectory. That explanation does not encroach on any theory of 
matter. An occupying point is irrelevant save as an illustrative fiction. 10 
Yet we do accept exactly that explanation in real if approximate cases. The orbit of 
Mercury is calculated treating the planet as a point (among other approximations). The 
observed advance of the planet’s perihelion, famously, is very close to the GR-predicted 
Galileo-trajectory along which the idealised planet would extend. The orbit is a spacetime 
straight. Unknown stresses within the planet, and unobserved imperfections in its straight 4-
                                                
9 Not an inertial frame, since spacetime is curved and lacks parallels. Only in the limit is spacetime flat and 
inertial frames locally available. 
1010 Nerlich 1979 §4; Nerlich 1991 §3 and 4. 
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trajectory are ignored. We fully understand why the orbit is the one we see: it’s virtually a 
geodesic. As an illustration, it traces the structure of spacetime. The structure is not a hidden 
something (not concealed, obscured, not too small, not too fine). It is observed with highly 
non-trivial precision, even though we know that we see an approximation and that the 
unoccupied straight itself is not a visual object. 
For similar reasons, in illustrative explanations, we may ignore the epicycle of feeding 
the small masses of the specks back into the T tensor. That will simply generate a new set of 
straights and these will be causal-default trajectories as before; the geometric explanation 
exploits just the same feature of the revised spacetime structure and its straights. It wasn’t 
really ever about the properties of matter.11 
 
5 A parody of ‘hidden cause’ 
 
I turn to a lively and very explicit satire on the hidden cause part of the argument in 
the first three sentences I began with; it is given in Brown and Pooley 2004 §1 and repeated in 
Brown 2005, p.24. It will be clear that it contrasts sharply with the story just told. It 
amusingly parodies geometric explanation as causal. In a geometrical explanation, they 
suggest, matter must follow something like “grooves” or “gutters” in spacetime along which 
spacetime “nudges” them. (Brown 2005, p.24, p.161 for “nudge”). The thought is that the 
grooves force things to follow them. Clearly, this geometric story is causal.  
I have no quarrel with the parody – but does anyone hold the view it attacks?12 
Despite their calling this view popular, I can think of no published versions of anything 
like it, although it sometimes – too often – comes up in discussion. It is quite unworkable; how 
could it yield the crucial result that the geodesic followed in free fall is independent of the 
mass of the falling body? But something makes this mistake easy; it is exactly what makes the 
argument I mentioned at the beginning of the paper so plausible. Doesn’t geometric 
explanation just have to be some kind of causal explanation? 
Two interesting points arise: (i) the parody rests on the presupposition that test bodies 
would be doing something else if the nudge along spacetime’s grooves did not turn them from it. 
Without that presupposition, the gutters, the nudges and the parody itself have no intelligible 
point. (ii) this never-mentioned something else would either be a state without external cause 
or have such a cause. If it is uncaused, some causal default state is tacitly recognised as 
necessary and intelligible: why not the groove-free state - the 1st law -  we began with? If it is 
an externally (e.g. electromagnetically) caused state, then GR tells us that the trajectories 
                                                
11 Compare (Brown 2005 p.24) that “… world-lines [of test ‘particles’] follow geodesics approximately and then for 
quite different reasons” from anything to do with the nature of test particles (his italics). Apart, of course from their 
natural tendency to persist. That leaves the story told here untouched. 
12 I do quarrel with their ascribing the view to me on the basis of a three-sentence quotation from my 1976 book 
in which I said (in terms of a familiar metaphor about antennae) that action at distance plays no role in GR. 
There is no hint of nudges, gutters, grooves or causes, There are 7 index items in the book under ‘Geometric 
explanation’. Not one of them is mentioned by Brown or Pooley; all of them argue for, state or imply a rejection of 
the story pinned on me. No item refers readers to the passage they cite; it is about GR’s being a local theory. I 
question whether any theory like the one parodied “has become very popular”, and their citing a mere three 
sentences about something entirely different suggests some desperation in the search to find any that does; it also 
suggests that Brown’s “it is one of the aims of this [his] book to rebut this and related views” is not an aim 
supported by significant research. Having trod what seems to me a solitary missionary path for 32 years, it is 
disappointing to find oneself cited as a leading spokesman for a supposedly widespread view that one has always 
opposed. Brown 2005 p. 23 includes the relevant claims. 
After an amicable discussion, I can report that the authors have withdrawn the attribution to me. 
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won’t be geodesical and the geodesical  grooves would play a totally obscure part in the 
parody.  I conclude that the parody depends on the tacit admission that causal default states 
are both essential and intelligible. I warmly welcome that, of course. It does presuppose the 1st 
law as causal default explanation, however. 
But, really, how can Brown or Pooley admit this? The rejection of causal defaults, 
mere kinematics, is just what their constructivism weds itself to. Everything is dynamics. 
Deploring mere kinematics, Brown, for instance, writes of the 1st law as a conspiracy “among 
force-free bodies to move in straight lines while being unable … to communicate … It is 
probably fair to say that anyone who is not amazed by this conspiracy has not understood it.” 
He asks “by what mechanism is the rod or clock informed … as to what this [spacetime] 
structure is?” (Brown 2005; p.8, pp.12-13)  Again (24) “it cannot simply be in the nature of 
free test particles to ‘read’ the projective geometry, or affine connection…” 
Of course not. If my earlier arguments are good, free rods and clocks know nothing, 
feel nothing, ‘read’ nothing, do nothing. Their natures are completely irrelevant. Were there 
unextended free fall (float) strict particles, they would do the very same thing in one spacetime 
as they do in any other: they stay put, do nothing. They simply endure. Their worldlines 
extend along zero acceleration, causal default, trajectories without benefit of nudge or 
communication. Spacetime structure relates Galileo trajectories to each other: curvature is 
their deviation. That the field equation entails the law of motion in GR is a significant formal 
result. But it can’t tell us what guides the point particles, since nothing can guide them. These 
are zero acceleration trajectories and can’t be steered, guttered or grooved. 
Nothing in my discussion suggests that we should know the causal default state a priori. 
My colleague, Greg O’Hair suggested that it might have been a random spatial walk. It is an 
empirical, theoretical fact that the causal default is a spacetime straight. The identities cited 
before are also empirical and theoretic. That makes perfect sense within a contingent 
geometry and mechanics. I claim that it is satisfactory. It is not causal. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Finally, there are two bits of unfinished business. Identity arguments are powerless to 
settle two remaining problems. (i) They can’t relate geometric structure in one spacetime 
region to that in another nearby region. But I do not think that is a causal relation either; (ii) 
Plausibly, if spacetime can’t act causally on matter then matter can’t act causally on 
spacetime. Identity arguments look impotent to tell us how matter is related to spacetime in 
that direction. The field equation is not an identity. Nevertheless, it is not causal either, but 
an equation of mutual constraint. (See Geroch 1978, p 174, 176). One aspect of the identity 
of gravitational with inertial mass is that GR need only consider inertial mass. The left hand 
side of the field equation need not be taken as a source term. This thought needs long and 
careful reflection on the relation between curvature of spacetime, gravitational potential 
energy and the mass of curved, empty spacetime and more. That is the topic of another paper 
– or two or three. Further, we can’t set up matter and then see what happens to spacetime; 
nor vice versa. Indeed, it is perhaps more common to specify a metric, then look for a suitable 
matter tensor. So these things don’t smell causal. But I hope there is something better to say 
about the problem than that. 
 
Graham Nerlich 
graham.nerlich@adelaide.edu.au 
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